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UNITED STATES v. BUTENKO: EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS
WIRETAPS FOR FOREIGN
SECURITY PURPOSES
From the original position that wiretapping was not a search and
seizure as the phrase is used in the fourth amendment,1 the Supreme
Court has progressed to the view that warrants must be obtained for all
wiretaps conducted for domestic intelligence purposes. 2 Nonetheless, the
Court's determination in the domestic area leaves open the question of
the president's authority without prior judicial approval to order wire-
taps monitoring the activities of foreign powers and agents within this
country.' When the United States Supreme Court recently denied cer-
tiorari in the case of Ivanov v. United States,4 it declined the opportunity
to resolve this issue. In United States v. Butenko,5 the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the government does have the authority
to conduct warrantiess wiretaps for foreign intelligence gathering. The
court in Butenko failed, however, to consider several of the factors
which influenced the Supreme Court's determination that warrants are
required for the surveillance of domestic groups. The Supreme Court
should have granted certiorari in order to determine the applicability of
these factors to circumstances involving foreign intelligence.
History of Wiretapping and the Fourth Amendment
The fundamental purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect
people from unreasonable searches and seizures. It requires that war-
rants be issued only upon probable cause and that a warrant describe
with particularity the place to be searched and the person or item to be
seized. The chief function of the warrant requirement is to place the
judicial system between the citizen and those who would invade his
privacy. The magistrate is to be a neutral person who determines
whether or not the present need of the law enforcer is great enough to
1. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
2. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
3. "We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may
be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents." Id. at 321-22.
4. 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
5. 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). Two defendants
were charged in this case, Igor Ivanov and John Butenko. This opinion, however, is
concerned solely with Ivanov's appeal.
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allow the invasion of the citizen's privacy. Furthermore, the magistrate is
to provide adequate safeguards to insure that searches and seizures are
kept within proper bounds.6
In the beginning of this century, physical invasion of the premises
was the standard by which the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined whether or not the fourth amendment had been violated. Wire-
tapping, at least when accomplished without physical trespass, was not a
fourth amendment infringement.' In 1934, Congress passed the Com-
munications Act,8 section 605 of which made it illegal to intercept and
divulge the contents of telephone conversations.9 The measure did not
include a provision for the granting of warrants in specific situations.
Although the federal government argued that the act was inapplicable
to federal agents, the Supreme Court rejected this contention. 10 Subse-
quently, the Court held that eavesdropping itself, with or without di-
vulgence, violated the fourth amendment if it was accomplished by
means of an "unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitu-
tionally protected area."" Although the determinative factor was still
whether or not a physical intrusion had occurred, the Court suggested
that the technicalities of local trespass law need not be met. 2
In Katz v. United States,'" decided in 1967, the Court effected a
major change in the law of wiretapping. In Katz, government agents
recorded petitioner's telephone conversation by means of an electronic
listening device which did not penetrate the phone booth in which he
6. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
7. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Court held that the
fourth amendment must be interpreted in light of the conditions existing at the time of
its adoption. Since telephones did not exist when the Constitution was written, its fram-
ers could not have considered wiretapping when they wrote the amendment. See id. at
465.
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
9. Courts generally interpreted the statute to mean that mere interception without
divulgence was not sufficient to violate the act. See, e.g., Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Tel.
Co., 404 F.2d 1023, 1027 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Carswell
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 449 S.W.2d 805, 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
10. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). The Court examined the
legislative history of section 605 and found that there was no discussion by Congress
as to whether or not federal agents were included in the provisions of the act. The ma-
jority concluded that Congress probably felt that letting some criminals go free was less
important than preventing officers from using unethical methods which ignored personal
liberty. See id. at 382-83. In a subsequent decision arising out of the Nardone case,
the Court held that the "fruits" of unlawful wiretapping could not be used to convict
a person. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
11. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961). In this case, a "spike
mike" was located so as to touch the heating duct of the house in which the defendants
were living, thus making the entire heating system a conductor of sound.
12. Id. at 511.
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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spoke. The Court found that this conduct constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure, emphasizing that the fourth amendment protects
people, not physical areas.14 The Court stressed the importance of the
judicial safeguards' 5 provided by the fourth amendment and concluded
that the judgment of government officials did not adequately protect an
individual's fourth amendment rights. The justices reasoned that the
neutral judgment of a magistrate is required and that because hindsight
is not a sufficient protection, authorization must be obtained prior to the
surveillance.'" The Court held that the few exceptions1 7 to the warrant
requirement do not apply to the wiretapping situation.
The decision in Katz would appear to require warrants for all
wiretapping. Nevertheless, the Court stated in a footnote that "[wiheth-
er safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would
satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security is a question not presented by this case."' 8 Although Katz
clearly avoided the question, the executive branch interpreted the case to
allow warrantless wiretapping for national security purposes.' 9
United States v. United States District Court:
Domestic Security Surveillance
In United States v. United States District Court,2 ° the Supreme
Court addressed the issue it had left open in Katz. It analyzed the
meaning of national security and the extent to which the executive
branch could conduct warrantless wiretaps in matters involving national
security. The Court's analysis, however, was limited to domestic situa-
tions since the evidence indicated that only domestic groups were in-
volved in the case. The Court declined to make a decision regarding the
president's surveillance authority with respect to foreign powers and
their activities either inside or outside this country.2 The majority
14. Justice Stewart offered no historical or constitutional basis for his conclusion
but pointed out that the idea that property interests control the government's right to
search and seize had been discredited. See id. at 353.
15. The Court found that the traditional safeguards were: showing probable cause
to an impartial judge before surveillance, following specific limitations established in ad-
vance by the court, and notifying the court subsequently of the information obtained dur-
ing the surveillance. See id. at 356.
16. Id. at 358.
17. The exceptions the Court discussed were searches incident to an arrest,
searches justified on the grounds of hot pursuit, and searches with the suspect's consent.
See id. at 357-58.
18. Id. at 358 n.23. Justice Stewart did not define national security, nor did he
indicate who should determine that a case involves national security.
19. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
20. Id.
21. See id. at 308-09.
concluded that the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment ap-
plies to domestic security cases.22
The three defendants in United States District Court were charged
with conspiracy to destroy government property. One of the defendants,
an alleged White Panther, was tried for the dynamite bombing of a
Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The gov-
ernment had conducted warrantless wiretaps which it alleged were
motivated by national security concerns since the purpose of the surveil-
lance was to obtain information about a domestic organization that was
trying to overthrow the government. The defendants moved pretrial for
disclosure of the information obtained from the wiretaps and for a
hearing to determine whether the information tainted the evidence
which the government intended to offer at trial.23 The district court
ordered disclosure on the basis that the electronic surveillance had
violated the defendants' fourth amendment rights. 24 The court of ap-
peals upheld the order,25 and the Supreme Court affirmed.26
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that the fourth
amendment is not absolute and that the case required a balancing of the
basic values involved. In balancing the duty of the government to
22. See id. at 321.
23. See United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76 (E.D. Mich. 1971),
a!f'd sub nom. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971),
aJI'd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The contents of an illegal wiretap must be disclosed to a
defendant so that he can determine whether the information obtained illegally led to any
other evidence which was used against him. See also Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 183 (1969).
24. See 321 F. Supp. at 1079-80.
25. 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).
26. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
27. See id. at 314-315. Justice Powell first discussed section 2511(3) of the Omni-
bus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, which states: "Nothing contained in this
chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitu-
tional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power,
to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or
against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Govern-
ment. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the
President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any
trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall
not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power." 18
U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970) (citation omitted). Justice Powell concluded that the section
was essentially neutral, neither conferring power on the president nor withdrawing it
from him. Thus, the section did not measure the executive branch's authority in this
case. See 407 U.S. at 303.
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protect domestic security against the danger which unreasonable surveil-
lances presented to individual privacy and expression of views,28 he
posed two questions. First, if surveillance were required to protect the
domestic security, would the privacy and free expression of the citizens
be "better protected by requiring a warrant before such surveillance is
undertaken"? Second, would a warrant requirement "unduly frustrate
the efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion and
overthrow directed against it"? 29
The Court found that protecting the country from subversion is a
presidential duty3 and that electronic surveillance might be necessary
for the performance of this duty. 1 Moreover, the opinion noted that the
executive branch might need to counter subversives with techniques
similar to those used by the subversives themselves.32 At the same time,
the Court recognized that these techniques could be used to invade the
privacy of "law-abiding citizens '33 and that therefore fourth amend-
ment safeguards must be applied to these "broad, unexpected invasions
by the government into conversational privacy. '34
The Court found special interests in national security cases that
differentiated them from ordinary criminal cases. First, security cases
involve a mingling of first and fourth amendment rights.38 Second, since
a government often views those who disagree with its policies with
suspicion, fourth amendment protections are even more important in
cases of political dissent than in cases of ordinary crime. 6 In this regard,
the Court noted the vagueness of the government's concept of protecting
the "domestic security. '37
The majority emphasized that at the heart of the fourth amend-
ment is the requirement that a warrant be obtained whenever practicable
so that a search and seizure can represent the views of the magistrate as
well as the officers involved. Justice Powell asserted that fourth amend-
ment freedoms could not be adequately protected if the executive branch
used its own discretion in conducting domestic security surveillances. 38
An officer of the executive branch, he added, is not an impartial
magistrate. Thus Justice Powell concluded that domestic security sur-
veillances require a neutral magistrate's scrutiny "because of the inher-
28. See 407 U.S. at 314-15.
29. Id. at 315.
30. See U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 1.
31. See 407 U.S. at 310.
32. See id. at 312.
33. Id.
34. Seeid. at313.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 313-14.
38. See id. at 317.
ent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad
and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to
utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent. '3 9 In addition, the
Court rejected post-surveillance judicial review as an adequate safeguard
because it would be used for only those surveillances which actually
resulted in prosecutions.4"
United States v. Butenko: Foreign Security Surveillance
In United States v. Butenko,4' the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered the issue of the president's authority to conduct
warrantless wiretaps for foreign rather than domestic intelligence pur-
poses. Three related questions were presented: 1) whether the fact that
foreign intelligence is involved eliminates the necessity of applying the
fourth amendment requirement of prior judicial review;4 2 2) whether, if
prior judicial authorization is not required, post-surveillance review is
nonetheless necessary;43 and 3) whether the probable cause standard in
foreign intelligence matters should be the same as that in criminal
cases.
44
The two defendants in Butenko, Igor A. Ivanov, a Soviet national,
and John Butenko, an American by birth, were convicted in federal
district court of conspiring to transmit United States defense information
to a foreign government. 45 After the defendants were convicted and
while their petition for certiorari was pending, the government revealed
that it had intercepted the defendants' conversations during two differ-
ent periods of time.46 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
39. See id. at 320.
40. The government proposed four reasons why a warrant should not be required
prior to surveillance. First, such a requirement would obstruct the president in carrying
out his constitutional duty to protect domestic security. Second, the surveillance in-
volved was for the purpose of gathering information about subversive forces. Third,
courts have neither the knowledge nor the techniques necessary to protect national secur-
ity. Finally, disclosure of secret information to a magistrate would pose a serious threat
to national security and to the lives of informants and agents. Id. at 318-19.
41. 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
42. Id. at 602.
43. Id. at 606.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 596. The information which the defendants conspired to transmit to
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was the plan of a command and control system
of the Strategic Air Command. Id. at 616.
46. The government conducted two sets of interceptions. The first set covered the
period between May 15, 1963 and June 11, 1963 and the period between June 27, 1963
and August 13, 1963. Id. at 617. Since the government did not disclose the contents
of the second set to the defendants, the dates which that set concerned are unknown.
These surveillances occurred before the Katz decision, but the court did not review the
method by which the wiretaps were installed because the government did not rely on
pre-Katz law. See id. at 604 n.42.
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manded the case to the district court, holding that records of any illegal
surveillance of the defendants must be disclosed to them. The district
court was instructed to determine whether the wiretapping had violated
the fourth amendment rights of either of the defendants. If the surveil-
lances had been illegal, the district court was to determine whether any
of the information obtained had tainted the convictions.4 7
The district court found that information obtained from the first set
of interceptions, which the government admitted had been illegal, had
not tainted the defendants' convictions.48 The prosecution claimed that
the second set of interceptions had been legal because the surveillance
had been conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence.
The court held that these interceptions, which it examined in camera,
had violated neither section 605 of the Communications Act of 193449
nor the fourth amendment. Therefore the government was not required
to disclose any of the records of the wiretaps to the defendants.50
Ivanov challenged the ruling on the second set of interceptions,
urging that they did violate both section 605 and the fourth amendment.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed as to
section 605 and remanded the case to the district court for disclosure of
the contents of the second set of tapes to Ivanov and for a hearing to
determine whether Ivanov's conviction had been tainted by the evi-
dence.51 Subsequently, the court of appeals granted the government's
petition for a rehearing en banc.52
The issue on rehearing was whether the second set of surveillances
had been illegal and, if it had been, whether disclosure of this set of
interceptions to the district court in camera had provided sufficient
compliance with the Supreme Court's instructions on remand.5 3 The
court ruled that disclosure of the second set of interceptions should be
required if the electronic interceptions had been illegal. 54 Whether or not
the government could be compelled to reveal legally obtained surveil-
lance was a matter within the discretion of the trial judge;5 5 therefore,
47. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 186 (1969).
48. See United States v. Ivanov, 342 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.J. 1972). Ivanov chal-
lenged this ruling, asserting that the loss or destruction of part of the records of the
first set of interceptions rendered the government incapable of showing that his convic-
tion was not tainted. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's findings. Ivanov's petition for a rehearing was denied by the court.
See 494 F.2d at 597.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
50. United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1970).
51. See 494 F.2d at 597.
52. See id.
53. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
54. See 494 F.2d at 598. The purpose of the disclosure is to insure that evidence
used against the defendant was not obtained from the illegal wiretaps.
55. The circuit court applied the reasoning of Taglianetti v. United States, 394
disclosure of legal interceptions should be required only if a trial judge
had abused his discretion.5 6
In ruling on the actual legality of the interceptions, the court held
that although the president in exercising his power to conduct foreign
affairs is bound by the fourth amendment, prior judicial authorization of
wiretaps used to gather foreign intelligence information is not necessary
and a warrant is not required.57 Thus, the second set of interceptions
had been legal. The court admitted that prior judicial review might be
beneficial in ensuring that the president was not using his foreign affairs
power as a coverup to conduct surveillance of domestic subversives.
Nonetheless, the court held that the best solution, in light of the strong
public interest in the efficient conduct of the president's foreign affairs
network, was to rely on the good faith of the president and the sanctions
available through post-surveillance review.58
The court observed that post-surveillance judicial review is an
effective safeguard for fourth amendment rights and that it should be
used in foreign intelligence cases to prevent any abuse resulting from the
lack of a warrant requirement. The reviewing judge should make certain
that the actual purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelli-
gence and not to find evidence of a crime or to eavesdrop on domestic
subversive organizations. 9
Moreover, the court held that when the government is gathering
foreign intelligence, the probable cause standard used in criminal cases
should be modified by deleting the requirement that the officer have a
reasonable belief that criminal activity has taken place or will occur. The
court concluded that requiring government officers to have a reasonable
belief that a crime is going to be committed would be ignoring that the
object of surveillance is to gather information necessary for making
informed judgments in foreign affairs, not to detect crime.60
In its conclusion, the court stated that the case required the balanc-
ing of the president's duty to conduct foreign affairs with society's
interest in privacy. Noting that the fourth amendment prohibits only
unreasonable searches and seizures, the court reasoned that when con-
sidered in light of the country's interest in self-defense, the instances of
U.S. 316 (1969). In that case, the Supreme Court held that when surveillance was not
illegal, disclosure depended upon whether the factual and legal issues in dispute could
be accurately determined and resolved without knowledge of the information obtained.
See 494 F.2d at 598. The purpose of disclosing the contents of legal wiretaps to the
defendant is to aid him in preparing his defense. Thus, disclosure is similar to other
discovery procedures.
56. 494 F.2d at 598.
57. See id. at 603.
58. See id. at 605.
59. Id. at 606.
60. See id.
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warrantless wiretapping had not been unreasonable and had not in-
fringed upon Ivanov's fourth amendment rights.""
A Critical View of United States v. Butenko
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit thus sanctioned the
creation of another exception to the warrant requirement by holding that
prior judicial review of wiretaps is not necessary when the government's
purpose is foreign intelligence gathering. Since the court concluded that
government officials did not need to find probable cause that criminal
activity had occurred or was going to take place and left the task of
establishing standards to the executive branch, the rule established by
the decision can be abused easily. Because the executive branch's pri-
mary role is to ensure that the laws are enforced, it will probably
emphasize its investigatory duties at the expense of protecting rights to
privacy; it is by no means an unbiased and neutral party. The historical
tendency of governments to suppress political dissent02 should be a
further incentive against placing the executive branch in the anomalous
position of enjoying the discretion to determine when warrantless wire-
taps are proper. The combination of dispensing with the probable cause
requirement and giving an interested party the discretion to determine
when to wiretap is wholly unsatisfactory.
Another shortcoming of the Butenko decision is that the court
failed to define foreign intelligence. Not only is the concept of foreign
intelligence extremely vague, but also a distinction between foreign and
domestic threats to the nation cannot readily be drawn, particularly
when a situation involves varying degrees of collaboration between
domestic groups and agents of foreign powers.0Y A domestic dissident
may have purely personal contact with a foreign agent, yet the govern-
ment may view this contact as a sufficient basis for invading the dissi-
dent's privacy. The executive branch can easily abuse its authority to
wiretap by classifying the information it seeks as foreign, not domestic.
Former Attorney General John Mitchell recognized the problems of
distinguishing foreign and domestic threats when he stated:
National security is indivisible. You can't separate foreign from
domestic threats to the government and say that we should meet
one less decisively than the other. I don't see how we can separate
the two, but if it were possible I would say that experience has
shown greater danger from the so-called domestic activity. 64
In fact, his statement indicates that if warrants are necessary for the
61. See id. at 608.
62. See 407 U.S. at 314.
63. Id. at 309 n.8.
64. Note, The Court & Electronic Surveillance: To Bug or Not to Bug-What
is the Exception?, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 76, 105 (1972).
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monitoring of domestic activities, they should certainly be required when
the surveillance focuses on foreign threats.
Furthermore, the Butenko decision limits judicial review of foreign
intelligence wiretaps to cases which result in prosecution or in which the
subjects somehow learn of the surveillance and sue for damages or an
injunction. Such retrospective judicial scrutiny plays no part in deter-
mining whether countless unrevealed surveillances were proper. Since,
as the court stated in Butenko,65 the main purpose of foreign security
surveillances is to gather information rather than to prosecute, it seems
likely that such searches will be revealed far less often than wiretaps
conducted for the detection of crime. Abolishing the warrant require-
ment in foreign intelligence cases thus significantly reduces the scope of
the judiciary's role as final arbiter of the constitutionality under the
fourth amendment of searches and seizures. 66
A Comparison of United States District Court and Butenko
Similarities of Foreign and Domestic Surveillance
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. United States
District Court should not be viewed as limiting the warrant requirement
to situations involving domestic intelligence gathering. Although the
Court in United States District Court had occasion to consider only the
domestic surveillance context, it can be demonstrated that the interest of
the government, the interests of the people whose privacy is invaded,
and the effects of not requiring a warrant are the same whether the
surveillance concerns domestic or foreign activities. Moreover, each of
the particular factors which influenced the Court's decision in United
States District Court to require warrants applies with equal force to the
foreign situation.
The executive branch's interest in both the foreign and domestic
aspects of national security is the preservation of the nation's existence. 7
Since the main purpose of both types of surveillance is therefore to
gather information about threats to national security, the government's
need to obtain foreign intelligence is no more immediate than its need to
gather domestic intelligence. In fact, the need for foreign intelligence
may, in many cases, be less immediate. Speed is unnecessary in long-
range surveillance, and the threat to national security may well be
remote when the government is merely seeking information concerning
the policies of other nations. Moreover, as former Attorney General
Mitchell has stated, it is well recognized that domestic groups can create
at least as great a threat to the nation's existence as can foreign coun-
65. See 494 F.2d at 606.
66. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
67. See 407 U.S. at 311-12; 494 F.2d at 608.
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tries. 8 Thus the threats from groups that are entirely domestic and from
groups with ties to foreign nations are equivalent.
If either foreign or domestic security surveillances are conducted
without warrants, the result is an infringement of interests protected by
the fourth and first amendments. Both the fourth amendment's protec-
tion against unreasonble invasions of privacy and its guarantee that
searches shall be specific are threatened. Any specificity in searches
performed without warrants would result solely from the self-imposed
restraint of government officials and not from the decision of a magis-
trate acting under constitutional restraints. Thus in both domestic
and foreign national security cases, the lack of a warrant requirement
can lead to general searches. Furthermore, once the search in either area
becomes general, the distinction between domestic and foreign intelli-
gence can easily be obscured, with the result that general searches are
allowed in both situations. The stricter requirements for domestic intelli-
gence gathering can thus become meaningless, as all information gather-
ing can be tied more or less closely to foreign intelligence. 9
Furthermore, regardless of the purpose of the surveillance, war-
rantless wiretaps endanger the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech. The absence of the warrant requirement in either domestic or
foreign intelligence situations inhibits free communication by increasing
the threat that telephone conversations will be monitored. This chilling
effect reaches not only persons with criminal or subversive intentions,
but also those who might become objects of governmental scrutiny
merely because they criticize policies of the government.
Moreover, in each context, a requirement that the fruits of an
illegal wiretap cannot be used in a prosecution does not prevent signifi-
cant infringement of fourth and first amendment freedoms. In both
domestic and foreign intelligence, the government is more interested in
gathering information than in prosecuting. The government can evade
review simply by deciding not to prosecute, thus maintaining the secrecy
of its operations.
68. See note 64 supra.
69. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973). Recently, some
instances of the executive branch's use of its wiretapping powers have been made public.
John Erlichman, former advisor to former President Nixon and a principal figure in the
Watergate scandal, justified burglarizing the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist by
asserting a need to find out whether a foreign spy ring was involved in the Pentagon
Papers. (Daniel Ellsberg is a former employee of RAND who was instrumental in giving
the Pentagon Papers to the press. The Pentagon Papers contain diplomatic communica-
tions concerning the early part of the Vietnamese war during the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations.) This example suggests the potential breadth of the executive branch's
power; the same reason could be given for wiretapping in connection with any event
which was adverse to the executive branch's interest. See Nesson, Aspects of the Execu-
tive's Power over National Security Matters: Secrecy Classifications & Foreign In-
telligence Wiretaps, 49 IMn. L.J. 399, 417 (1974).
Factors Balanced by the Courts
Both the United States Supreme Court in United States District
Court and the court of appeals in Butenko applied balancing tests. The
Supreme Court balanced the government's duty to protect domestic
security against the threat to individual privacy and freedom of expres-
sion created by unreasonable surveillance. 70 The court in Butenko bal-
anced the president's authority in foreign affairs with society's interest in
privacy.7'1 An examination of Butenko shows that the court greatly
biased its discussion in favor of the power of the executive branch,
despite the fact that the privacy of United States citizens as well as that
of foreign citizens was involved. In contrast, although the Supreme
Court discussed executive authority and considered the problems that a
warrant requirement might cause the executive branch, the justices
accorded individual privacy and freedom of expression greater defer-
ence.
72
The Supreme Court in United States District Court discussed four
factors which influenced its decision that on balance, warrants should be
required in domestic security cases: 1) the historical judgment, implicit
in the fourth amendment's contemplation of prior judicial review, that
without the warrant requirement, the government's desire to obtain
information would inevitably lead it to invade individuals' privacy; 2)
the mingling of first and fourth amendment rights in national security
cases; 3) the failure of post-surveillance judicial review to reach wire-
taps which do not result in prosecutions; and 4) the fact that domestic
security surveillance does not fit within any of the present exceptions to
the warrant requirement and that it does not justify the creation of
another exception.73 The Supreme Court held that these considerations
outweigh the interest of the executive branch in investigating domestic
threats to national security unhindered by a warrant requirement. Ap-
parently the court of appeals in Butenko failed to accord the interests in
individual freedom the same weight given them by the Supreme Court in
United States District Court, choosing instead to emphasize the power of
the executive branch in foreign affairs. This emphasis seems particularly
misguided in view of the fact that the foreign intelligence activities
occurred within United States borders and were directed in part at
United States citizens.
Moreover, the court of appeals failed to discuss the first three
factors upon which the Supreme Court relied, even though these factors
apply equally to the situation in Butenko. First, the appellate court made
70. See 407 U.S. at 319-20.
71. See 494 F.2d at 608.
72. See 407 U.S. at 319-20.
73. Id. at 317-20.
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no attempt to explain why the fourth amendment protections of individ-
ual privacy would be less threatened by executive discretion in foreign
intelligence gathering than in domestic security cases. Second, the Bu-
tenko decision made no evaluation of the infringment of first amend-
ment rights which electronic surveillance could involve. As Justice
Powell noted in United States District Court: "The danger to political
dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague
a concept as the power to protect 'domestic security.' -7 The ability
to secure foreign intelligence information is also a vague concept which
threatens political dissent. Moreover, as mentioned above, if general
searches are permissible in foreign intelligence matters, the distinction
between foreign and domestic intelligence can readily be blurred.
Third, the court in Butenko was not concerned with the fact that post-
surveillance judicial review reaches only wiretaps that result in prosecu-
tions. Thus, the court completely overlooked the concerns expressed
by Justice Powell in United States District Court that post-surveillance
judicial review is not an adequate protection of first and fourth amend-
ment rights. 75
The court of appeals in Butenko did discuss the fourth factor
considered by the Supreme Court in United States District Court-the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. The circuit court placed great
emphasis on a purported analogy between the public interest in obtain-
ing foreign intelligence information and a similar strong public interest
in home visits by welfare workers .76 The home visitation warrant excep-
tion, however, does not involve a concept so vague as foreign intelli-
gence. Furthermore, it is at least possible to give notice of visits to
welfare recipients. In contrast, people whose telephones are wiretapped
under a foreign intelligence exception may never learn of the intrusion.
The court also failed to note that the two situations affect the freedom of
speech differently. Regardless of other constitutional problems,7 7 a
home visit inhibits speech only during the actual visit. The potential
threat of foreign intelligence surveillance, however, may inhibit a per-
son's speech each time he uses the telephone. Moreover, the invasion of
privacy in a home visit lasts for a short and definite period of time while
electronic surveillance may invade a person's privacy for long and
indefinite periods. Therefore, the analogy between the home visitation
74. Id. at 314.
75. See id. at317-18.
76. See 494 F.2d at 605; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). The signifi-
cance of this case is that the court found that welfare workers need not obtain warrants
prior to home visits because the visits are not actual searches. Thus, the analogy to
foreign intelligence gathering is distinctly in error because there is no question that elec-
tronic surveillance constitutes a search.
77. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
cases and the foreign intelligence situations is wholly unconvincing. In
addition, whatever validity the analogy might conceivably have would
seem to apply equally to domestic intelligence operations. In sum, the
court in Butenko blithely adopted an exception to the warrant require-
ment despite the Supreme Court's refusal to do so and without an
adequate explanation as to why the reasoning in United States District
Court was inapplicable to the circumstances in Butenko.
Aside from ignoring the first three factors delineated by the Su-
preme Court in United States District Court, and dealing inadequately
with the fourth factor, the court in Butenko relied on two further
rationales for its different decision. It implied that the requirement of a
warrant for foreign intelligence gathering would at times force the
president to act illegally in order to perform his constitutional duties
when he needed to act quickly and secretly. 78 Again, the court offered
no reasons why this possibility should be more likely in foreign intelli-
gence contexts than in domestic investigations. Moreover, the likelihood
of a president acting illegally does not justify sacrificing individual rights
in order to eliminate the possiblity of illegality. The judiciary and the
executive branch should instead develop an alternative procedure for
emergencies.
The opinion also stated that requiring warrants in foreign intelli-
gence cases would cause the executive department undue hardship.
Thus, requiring these officials to determine when a warrant is or is not
needed would seriously handicap the executive department's perform-
ance of its foreign affairs duties.79 This reasoning, too, is specious, as
officers encounter the same problem when monitoring domestic activi-
ties and suspected crime, yet in neither of these areas has the Supreme
Court found warrantless wiretaps justified.
Conclusion
The potential for presidential illegality rationale and the undue
hardship rationale, combined with the invalid analogy between the
warrantless wiretaps to gather foreign intelligence and home visits by
welfare workers, offer scant support for the Butenko decision. The
insufficiency of the Butenko departure from the United States District
Court holding is further elucidated by a comparison of the two cases,
because the interests of the government and the individual, as well as the
threats to individual freedoms and governmental effectiveness, appear to
be the same in each case. The failure of the court in Butenko to
recognize the threats to first amendment rights, its inadequate considera-
tion of potential invasions of privacy, and its almost total deference to
78. See 494 F.2d at 605.
79. Id.
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the arguments asserted by the government were manifestly contradictory
to the teachings of the Supreme Court in United States District Court.
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in the case of United
States v. Ivanov8° and articulated the constitutional basis, if any, for an
exception to the warrant requirement when the government is conduct-
ing wiretaps to gather foreign intelligence.
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